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CASES NOTED
procedure, parole and probation statutes,' 7 juvenile courts, and general rules
of equitable relief, suspension of sentence seems to be out-of-date. The
United States Supreme Court has said that this procedure virtually evinces
a refusal of the judiciary to perform a duty resting upon it.' s In fact, this
practice seems to be at variance with a Florida statute. 19 The state has a
right to demand and society requires that one who has been convicted of a
violation of the law or one who has entered a plea of guilty should be punished
as the law sets forth.2° If a defendant may remain under a suspension of
sentence for three years, there would seem to be nothing to prevent that
21
sentence from continuing for fifteen years.

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY IN FEDERAL COURTS OF CONFESSIONS
OBTAINED DURING ILLEGAL DETENTION
Defendant was arrested and detained beyond the time allowed prior to
being taken before a committing magistrate for the filing of a complaint against
him.' During this period of illegal detention, a confession was obtained from
defendant without the use of protracted questioning. Held, that since the confession was made during a period of illegal detention, it was inadmissible.
Upshaw v. United States, 69 Sup. Ct. 170 (1948).
The principal case resolves the conflict between the McNabb 2 case and
the Mitchell 3 case regarding the admissibility of confessions obtained during
an illegal detention in the absence of additional coercive factors. In the
McNabb case, federal officers arrested the defendant and detained him beyond
the time legally allowed prior to presenting him before a committing magistrate. 4 A confession obtained from him during this illegal detention was held
17. Fla. Laws 1941, c. 20519, § 1, F. S. A. 947 (parole) (1941) ; Fla. Laws 1941, e.
20519, § 35, F. S. A. 948 (probation) (1941).
18. Er parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916).
19. Fla. Laws,1941, c. 20519, § 20, F. S. A. 948.01-4 (1941) : "In no case shall the
imposition of sentence be suspended and the defendant thereupon placed on probation unless
such defendant be placed under the custody of said parole officer."
20. People ex rel Smith v. Allen, supra.
21. See people v. Reilly, 53 Mich. 260, 18 N.W. 849, 850 (1884) (dissenting opinion).
1. FED. R. CRIM. P., 5(a) (Requires an arresting officer to take one charged with
offenses against the laws of the United States before the nearest committing officer
without unreasonable delay).
2. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) [This case also clearly points out
that the basis of the exclusion or admission of confessions in federal courts is not any
-constitutional issue but rather the ability of the Supreme Court to establish standards
of evidence. The admissibility of allegedly coerced confessions in, state courts on appeal
to the Supreme Court, on the other hand, is always dependent upon the absence or
presence of due process. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948); Malinski v. New York,
324 U.S. 401 (1945)].
3. Mitchell v. United Stites. 322 U.S. 65 (1944).
4. The rule upon which the illegal detention in the :lfcrobb case was founded was
the predecessor of the rule involved in the instant case. See note 1 supra.
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inadmissible as evidence, because it was the result of the illegal detention.r
Subsequently, in the Mitchell case, the Court commented on the McNabb case
and stated that the illegal detention was there considered the cause of the
confession because of the protracted questioning during that illegal detention,6
thereby indicating that the McNabb confession would have been admissible
despite the illegal detention had such detention not been accompanied by protracted questioning.7
The Mitchell case thus left open the question involved where a confession
was obtained during an illegal detention without the use of protracted questioning. s The instant case posed such a question, and the Court affirmed the
position taken in the McNabb case, saying: ".

.

. a confession is inadmissible

if made during illegal detention due to failure promptly to carry a prisoner
before a committing magistrate, whether or not the 'confession is the result
of torture, physical or psychological. .

. .' " 9

Much criticism has been leveled at the McNabb decision, 10 principally
on the ground that its result unduly weakens one of the most effective means
of apprehending criminals-a reasonable time in which to interrogate
suspects-''-by confusing law enforcement officers as to the admissibility of
any confession obtained before commitment. 12 Obviously, the instant case is
subject to the same criticism. Such objections led to the introduction of the
Hobbs Bill, 18 designed to legislate the McNabb rule out of existence. However, this bill was abandoned when the Mitchell decision seemed to qualify the
McNabb rule by requiring protracted questioning in order to render inadmissible a confession obtained during an illegal detention. Yet the McNabb

5. While the prisoner in the McNabb case was protractedly questioned by the
detaining officers during the illegal detention, the Court based the inadmissibility of the
confession on the fact of the illegal detention, not the protracted questioning.
6. See note 5 supra.
7. Where the problem has arisen in state jurisdictions, illegal detention of itself
has not been considered sufficient to render inadmissible a confession obtained therein
in the absence of other coercive elements. People v. Alex, 265 N.Y. 192, 192 N.E. 289
419, 129 N.E. 193 (1920).
(1934) ; People v. Vinci, 295 Ill.
8. The leading case on what constitutes protracted questioning is Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322. U.S. 143 (1944). This note concerns only the effect of illegal detention upon
a confession obtained therein by or without the use of protracted questioning. The many
leading cases involving coercive factors other than protracted questioning and illegal
detention are, therefore, not discussed in the text. Cf. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) ;
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) ; White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
9. See Upshaw v. United States, 69 Sup. Ct. 170, 172 (1948).
10. Notes, 42 Micii. L. Rvv. 679, 909 (1944), 56 HARV. L. REV. 1008 (1943).
11. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the U.S. Supreme Court, 43 ILL. L. REV.
442 (1948).
12. United States v. Klee, 50 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Wash. 1943).
13. 89 CoNG. Rac. 9711 (1943) (which proposed that confessions admissible except
for the fact of illegal detention should not be rendered inadmissible thereby).
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decision has not been without supporters," as was exemplified by criticism of
the Hobbs Bill.15
While the decision in the instant case tends to keep the scope of criminal
interrogation by federal officers within reasonable bounds, inflexible application of the rule may also have the effect of unduly restricting persons assigned
the duty of protecting public interests, since it may not give them sufficient
opportunity to question criminal suspects. This situation could be corrected
by making the admissibility of confessions dependent upon legislative
standards which bear greater logical relation to the validity of the contession
than does the present standard of a commitment statute which, as its history
reveals, was enacted for an entirely different purpose and had no such result
within its purview. 1

PROCEDURE-APPEAL EFFECTED BY BROAD APPLICATION OF THE
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
In 1939, forty-seven years after an adjudication, in 1892, of the priorities
and other rights of the parties in the waters of a creek, a suit was brought by
lower riparian owners to enjoin plaintiff from takifig more water fronm the
creek than he was allowed under the 1892 decree. Judgment was rendered for
plaintiff. On appeal, the judgment was reversed and the injunction granted.
Plaintiff was also enjoined from asserting any claims contrary to the terms
of the 1892 decree. Thereupon, plaintiff petitioned for a rehearing, which was
denied. Plaintiff than petitioned the supreme court of the state for a writ of
supervisory cofntrol. Again his petition was denied. Plaintiff then started an
action in the lower court for a declaratory judgment as to his rights and for
relief against the injunction. A demurrer by the defendants was sustained,
and plaintiff appealed. Held, demurrer overruled. An action for a declaratory
judgment and seeking relief from the injunction which restrained him from
asserting claims contrary to the mandates of the 1892 decree could be maintained. Perkins v. Kramer, 198 P.2d 475 (Mont. 1948).
The Montana Supreme Court has given a persevering litigant the rare
legal experience of having rights, defined on two previous occasions, rehdjudicated, 1 explaining that application of the doctrine of res judicata will not
14. NOTE, 28 MINN. L.REv. 73 (1944) [commenting that the McNabb decision isthe
logical development of decisions excluding illegally obtained evidence as exemplified by
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) and Nardohe v. United States, 308 U.S.
338 (1939)].
15. Note, 53 YALE L. J. 758 (1944) (criticizing the Hobbs Bill as an unwarranted
, interference with the judicial power of forming evidentiary rules).
16. 24 CONG. REc. 1107 (1893) (illustrating that the reason for the adoption of
the former rule was to prevent officers in one part of a state from taking a prisoner the
whole length of the state to have a hearing before a particular commissioner, thereby
earning compensation for mileage).
I. Woodward v. Perkins, 116 Morit. 46, 147 P.2d 1016 (1944).

